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ABSTRACT 
FINANCIAL GROWTH OF THE TURKISH DEFENSE 
INDUSTRY: 
AN EXPLANATORY ANALYSIS 
 
Çakır, M. Umut 
M.B.A., Department of Management 
Supervisor: Doç. Dr. Can Şımga-Muğan 
September 2003 
 
The importance of the Turkish defense firms that sell various products to 
the Turkish Armed Forces has been gradually increasing in the last decade, 
especially after the September 11, 2001. Turkey has to pay more attention to 
the national defense industry, because of the threats and serial crisis in the 
region. The companies in defense industry have very important role in 
economy however; decreasing the defense expenditures will accelerate the rate 
of economic growth. As a result, the strategies for the financial growth of 
defense firms are very crucial. The purpose of this study is to identify how 
Turkish Defense Industry financed growth in sales and assets during the five-
year period and how they should finance growth in order to realize a 
respectable sustainable growth rate.  
Keywords: Defense Industry, Turkish Defense Industry, And Sustainable 
Corporate Growth 
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRK SAVUNMA SANAYİİNİN FİNANSAL BÜYÜMESİ: 
AÇIKLAYICI BİR ANALİZ 
 
M. Umut ÇAKIR 
YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, İŞLETME FAKÜLTESİ 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Can Şımga-Muğan 
Eylül, 2003 
 
Ülkemizde Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin çeşitli ihtiyaçlarına yönelik 
üretim yapmakta olan savunma sanayii şirketlerinin önemi gün geçtikçe 
artmaktadır. Özellikle 11 Eylül 2001’den sonraki gelişmeler bu önemi daha da 
arttırmıştır. Bölgesindeki tehditler ve seri krizler sebebiyle, Türkiye’nin ulusal 
savunma sanayiine çok daha fazla önem vermesi gerekmektedir. Savunma 
sanayii şirketleri ülke ekonomisinde çok önemli bir role sahip olmakla birlikte 
aslında savunma harcamalarının azaltılması ekonomik büyümeyi 
hızlandırmaktadır. Bu yüzden savunma sanayii şirketlerinin finansal 
büyümelerine yönelik stratejiler büyük önem arz etmektedir. Bu çalışmanın 
amacı Türk Savunma Sanayiinin 1997-2001 yılları arasındaki reel ve 
sürdürülebilir büyümesini ve etki eden faktörlerini tespit etmek ve büyümenin 
nasıl finanse edilmesi gerektiğini incelemektir.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Savunma Sanayii, Türk Savunma Sanayii, 
Sürdürülebilir Büyüme 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Defense industry, which produces strategic and tactical, offensive and 
defensive weapon systems, military accessories and plans related services that are 
needed to defend a country, is an organization with a group of public and private 
companies (Alnıak, 2003).  
The geographical position of Turkey, at the heart of the most unstable 
“Bermuda Triangle” in the world—the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East—
makes it imperative to maintain a strong and modern military.  Turkey is expanding 
its national defense industry to support its armed forces.  Turkey is a member of the 
United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
(EAPC) and the Western European Union (WEU) (White Book 2002, p. IV). Being a 
strength and balance element in the region, Turkey pays more attention to defense 
than some other countries. 
The Ministry of National Defense, which plans to modernize the Turkish 
Armed Forces, is financed mainly by the national budget and the Defense Industry 
Support Fund and partly by foreign military loans and contributions in connection 
with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.  The budget of The Ministry of 
National Defense is approximately 3.6 percent of the GNP on average and around 12 
percent in the Consolidated Budget, which is the highest percentage among NATO 
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nations.  The average allocation of the Ministry of National Defense’s budget is as 
follows (The Ministry of National Defense, 2000):  
 
• Turkish General Staff                                                  7.7 % 
• Ministry of National Defense                                      7.3 % 
• Land Forces Command                                              49.5 % 
• Naval Forces Command                                            13.9  % 
• Air Forces Command                                                 21.6  % 
The roots of current defense enterprises can be traced back to the transfer of the 
limited arms manufacturing capability of the Ottoman Empire to Ankara during the 
War of Independence. In the 1920s and 1930s, the defense industry expanded to 
meet the internal security requirements of the new Republic. Turkey's entry into the 
Western military alliance system after The World War II brought these developments 
to a sudden stop. Massive amounts of US arms were poured into the country. The 
embryonic aircraft industry was dismantled in 1959, and plans for the manufacture of up-
to-date infantry weapons were postponed. This massive injection of military aid also 
ended the policy of diversified arms suppliers. Almost all of the front-line equipment of 
the armed forces was of US origin. Some Western aid went into military workshops and 
shipyards to produce spare parts and maintain imported equipment (Karasapan, 1987). 
The first shock to Turkish confidence in the US came during the 1960 Cuban 
missile crisis. Washington's readiness, to trade its missiles in Turkey for Soviet 
missiles in Cuba, showed that Turkey was no trusted ally but a mere pawn in the Cold 
War. Turkish government was even more affronted in 1964, when Lyndon Johnson 
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informed Prime Minister Ismet Inönü about the impossibility of the usage of the US-
supplied arms in Cyprus (Karasapan, 1987). 
These challenges to the Turkish state's esteem and the modernization 
requirements of World War II old-model weapons, which were no longer sufficient to 
meet the country's needs, created a Re-modernization Plan (REMO I) in 1970 (White 
Book 2002, Part XI). The plan reflected not only the political decision to expand arms 
production but also the economic reality that foreign grants and concessionary loans 
could no longer meet the high-tech, high-cost weaponry needs of the Turkish army. 
The US arms embargo following the 1974 Turkish intervention in Cyprus and 
later the embargo by some Western powers following the 1980 military coup gave 
greater impetus to these moves. Turkish decision-makers saw little choice but to 
expand the country's defense industry, to diversify and lessen its dependence on the 
outside sources. 
Turkish Defense Industry was given a big boost with the establishment of the 
Undersecretariat for Defense Industries in 1985 (SSM), which is responsible for the 
development and modernization of the Turkish defense industry.  Turkey began its 
defense-related modernization program in 1986 with co-production of F16 fighter 
aircraft, armored infantry fighting vehicles and light transport aircraft. Even though 
the development of the Turkish defense industry has not reached the desired level as 
of yet, Turkey has been able to export her products to every corner of the earth in the 
fields of defense electronics, rockets, aviation and armored vehicles. Turkish 
frequency radiotelegraphy and radar are way ahead of their giant competitors in the 
Far East. There is now a vast market for Turkish armored vehicles in North Africa 
and in the Middle East, which had been previously taken by Turkey’s competitors in 
this field (Undersecretariat of Defense Industry, 2000). 
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Being an important part of the economic structure of a country, defense 
industry has some differences from other industries as follows (Şimşek, 1997): 
• It requires trained manpower 
• It needs special quality standards 
• It always uses the newest technology, and therefore R&D activities are 
crucial 
• Defense companies generally do not have the flexibility to transform the 
production to civilian products 
• More attention is paid to safety and secrecy 
• Since there are a few buyers, it requires limited production 
• It requires large amount of investment 
• The defense firms need to enter to international markets in order to survive 
 
Generally, the defense sector makes use of state-of-the-art-technology and is 
a sector often described as the “locomotive power” of the industry (Burçak, 1997). 
Besides its strategic importance, defense companies play a major role in the 
economy. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to identify, using Higgins’ concept1, 
how defense firms financed growth in sales and assets between the years 1997-2001 
and how they should finance growth in order to realize an acceptable sustainable 
growth rate. Since understanding a firm’s sustainable growth rate provides 
information whether the firm is likely to encounter financial distress in the future, it 
will be helpful in order to make projections about the financial future of the Turkish 
Defense Industry. 
                                                 
1 Higgins’ concept is the most referenced sustainable growth model. Higgins (1970) defines 
sustainable growth as the annual percentage increase in sales that is consistent with the firm's 
established financial policies. The firm's established financial policies include the dividend payout 
ratio and use of debt financing. The model will be explained in more detail in Chapter 3 on page 17. 
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Turkey’s National Defense Policy and the Characteristics of Turkish Defense 
Industry are explained in Chapter 2. Then brief information about sustainable growth 
is given in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 explains data and methodology. Chapter 5 contains 
the results of the studies. Finally conclusion and discussions appear in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2 
   
TURKISH DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
 
This chapter starts with a brief review of Turkey’s National Defense Policy 
and resources of defense expenses. The rest of the discussion focuses on the 
Characteristics of The Turkish Defense Industry and the defense research and 
technology projects.  
2.1 Turkey’s National Defense Policy 
The threats and risks that Turkey has confronted with in the post-Cold War 
period are rather different from those in the past. At the end of the Cold War, there 
was a search for a new world system by the effect of globalization, which also 
changed the concepts of threat. The traditional concept of threat has now started to 
contain new threats and risks emerging in the form of (White Book 2002, Part IV): 
• Regional and ethnic conflicts 
• Political and economic instabilities and uncertainties in the countries 
• Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles 
• Religious fundamentalism 
• Smuggling of drugs and all kinds of weapons  
• International terrorism 
Turkey is located at the center of the triangle formed by the Balkans, 
Caucasus and the Middle East, where new threats and risks are concentrated. Turkey 
is placed in a region where the interests of the global powers and formations 
intersect. This situation, stemming from Turkey's geostrategic location, has not 
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changed until now and will not change in the twenty-first century. It is evaluated that 
the importance of Turkey in the new world system will become even more 
strengthened. Turkey's Defense Policy is prepared to protect and preserve national 
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and vital interests of the country. For 
that reason, the following are the targets of Turkey in her National Defense Policy at 
the beginning of the twenty-first century as a requirement of the period (White Book 
2002, Part IV): 
• To contribute to peace and security in the region and to spread this to large 
areas 
• To become a country producing strategy and security that could influence all 
strategies aimed at the region and beyond 
• To become an element of power and balance in the region 
• To make use of every opportunity and to take initiatives for cooperation, 
becoming closer and developing positive relations with global and regional 
powers. 
The basic principles of the Defense policy determined in the framework of 
the principle, "Peace at Home, Peace in the World", set forth by Atatürk, are as 
follows: 
• To make a maximum contribution to reduce all kinds of international tensions 
and provision of just and lasting peace, 
• To preserve and protect independence, territorial integrity and the republic, 
• To take all measures to prevent crises and conflicts 
• To take an active part in collective defense systems and to fulfill the 
responsibilities entrusted to it. 
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2.2 Resources of Defense Expenses 
 
 The determination of defense expenses and resources are carried out within 
the framework of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) (White 
Book 2002, Part IX). When making an evaluation of the probable resources to be 
allocated to the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), the possible amount, magnitude of 
resources that could be allocated for defense expenses during the planning period 
within the framework of factors such as general economic indicators, growth rate, 
foreign trade balance, price and cost increases, foreign aid and loan possibilities, 
development plans, government program and the programs and obligations in effect 
is determined. 
The resources of defense expenses are composed of (Undersecretariat of 
Defense Industry, 2002): 
• Allocated Resources from the National Defense Budget, 
• Resources from the Defense Industry Support Fund (DISF), 
• Resources from the TAF Strengthening Foundation (SF), 
• Budget of the Gendarmerie General Command, 
• Budget of the Coast Guard Command, 
• Foreign State or Company Loans Repaid from the Budget of the 
Undersecretariat of The Treasury  
• Revenues based on the Special Laws of the Ministry of National Defense. 
The most important portion of the resources allocated to defense is constituted by the 
budget of the Ministry of National Defense. The budget is composed of four parts 
according to main service groups (White Book 2002, Part IX): 
• Personnel Expenses 
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• Other Current Expenses 
• Investments and Transfers. 
Personnel expenses reflect all costs that are directly related to personnel and 
are determined according to the legislation. Other Current Expenses comprise the 
most significant part of the budget. The modernization projects, which are included 
in the Strategic Target Plans (STP), allocations of funds for food and clothing of 
military personnel as set in by laws, construction, building repairs, duty travel 
expenses, fuel, electricity, water, natural gas, treatment and medication needs, fixed 
assets, stationery needs, cargo and transportation services, procurement of spare 
parts, are provided for in this main service group. Investments are composed of 
vehicles procurement, some construction projects and various renovation projects. 
Transfers include membership due to international organizations, nationalization, 
payment of debts from previous years and social assistance to be made to various 
associations, unions, institutions and organizations. 
The share of the Ministry of National Defense budget in the Gross National 
Product (GNP) is on average 2.5 percent and around 9.7 percent of the Consolidated 
Budget. On the other hand, about 30 percent of the Ministry of National Defense 
budget is allocated for personnel expenses, 68.9 percent for other current expenses 
and the balance for investment and transfer expenses (White Book 2002, Part IX). 
 
 
2.3 Characteristics of Turkish Defense Industry 
 
The requirements of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) are met by direct 
purchase from the domestic and foreign markets or by participation in joint 
production programs. Direct purchases from the domestic market are the products 
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developed by the domestic producers or manufactured under license (technology 
transfer) from foreign countries. There are also products that are obtained as the 
result of the joint activities through research and development (R&D) of the TAF and 
the domestic producers.  
Turkey, which aims to become a self-sufficient country in the field of defense 
equipment, has accelerated its activities and concentrated its efforts on this field. The 
Turkish Defense Industry, in order to be able to reach the advanced level necessary 
in the production of the modern defense equipment, is trying to develop its 
production resources and capabilities, either by means of its own resources or by 
participating in joint production projects together with the Allied Countries or by 
means of technology transfer. In this framework, the cooperation programs carried 
out with the Allied Countries in the structure of NATO or the European Union (EU) 
have a significant place in Turkey's defense industry activities. As a result, the 
development of the Turkish Defense Industry has further accelerated and its sectoral 
infrastructure has been completed to a great extent. 
On the basis of main weapons systems, 80 percent of the defense equipment 
is presently procured from abroad (Undersecretariat of Defense Industry, 2002). It is 
targeted to change this ratio and to increase the domestic procurement ratio to levels 
that will make Turkey's defense industry sufficient and independent. 
Providing all kinds of weapons, vehicles, equipment and materials needed by 
the TAF from national resources is very crucial from the aspect of preserving and 
strengthening the existing defense industry foundation and of creating employment. 
The Main Sectors of the Turkish Defense Industry are classified as follows 
(Undersecretariat of Defense Industry, 2002): 
• Aviation and Space Industry, 
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• Rocket and Missile Industry, 
• Electronics Industry, 
• Weapons and Ammunition Industry, 
• Military Shipbuilding Industry, 
• Military Automotive and Armored Vehicle Industry  
• Military Clothing Industry. 
A major portion of the companies related to the Turkish Defense Industry is 
collected under the roofs of the Defense Industry Manufacturers Association (DIMA) 
and the Defense Industrialists Association (DIA). The DIMA and DIA constitute a 
bridge between the producers and customers. They analyze and interpret the 
information collected and send them to their members and other related parties. 
DIMA is also a member of the European Defense Industry Group (EDIG). 
Turkey generally faces the same problems of the developing countries while 
generating her own defense industry. These problems are (Ministry of National 
Defense 2001, p. XII-XIII): 
• Defense spendings occupy a major part of GNP but because of low GNP 
these spendings are not enough 
• Problems in transferring new technology to Turkey 
• Insufficiency of current production technology 
• High production costs 
• Financing problems 
• Lack of trained workforce 
• Economies of scale 
• Dependency on foreign industries 
• Regulatory policies 
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• Price has primary importance more than technology and human resources 
• Firms concentrate on production, however; there are major problems in 
maintenance 
The production of high technology war weapons and vehicles in Turkey with 
the objective of meeting the needs of the Armed Forces constitutes the foundation of 
the Turkish Defense Industry Strategy. Turkey's National Military Strategy (TNMS) 
and the Planning and Programming Directive (PPD) are used as a source in the 
determination of the Defense Industry Strategy. 
The Defense Industry policy envisages the formation of a defense industry 
that (White Book 2002, Part IX): 
 
• Is open to the foreign sector as well as the domestic sector, 
• Has an export potential and capability to compete internationally, 
• Can produce new technology and has a dynamic structure, 
• Makes it possible to have balanced defense industry cooperation between 
Turkey and other countries and is influenced to a minimum extent by the 
changing political conditions 
• Can also engage in production for civilian purposes. 
 
2.4 Defense Research and Technology Projects 
 
The defense research and technology projects are collected under the three 
main groups specified below (Undersecretariat of Defense Industry, 2002): 
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• System development projects that are carried out for the development of the 
existing systems of the TAF. These projects are in the categories of "Must Be 
National" and "Critical". 
• Technological infrastructure formation projects related to the technologies on 
which these systems are based.  
• Basic research projects directed to these technologies. 
The system development projects are carried out by industrial organizations, 
technological infrastructure formation projects are carried out by industrial 
organizations and the Scientific and Technical Research Institution of Turkey 
(TUBITAK), and basic research projects are carried out by the universities. 
Approximately 2 percent of the defense budget is allocated for the financing 
of defense research activities in Turkey. Furthermore, the defense industry 
organizations allocate 2-10 percent of their annual budgets for research and 
development activities (Ministry of National Defense, 2001). However, due to the 
defense budget cuts, every country cannot form an adequate infrastructure in all 
technological fields and because of the advantages of carrying out joint projects with 
other countries, great importance is placed on carrying out joint R&D projects with 
the friendly and allied countries. 
Turkey participates in the joint research and technology activities in the 
structure of NATO and the Western European Union (WEU). Western European 
Armament Group (WEAG), which is connected to the European Union, develops 
cooperation on the subjects of defense equipment in Europe. Turkey maintains a 
close cooperation with Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and The United Kingdom, 
which are the members of WEAG, along with Turkey. 
 14 
The projects in which Turkey participates along with the other WEAG 
countries are given below: 
• STINGER, 
• M483/M864 155 mm Advanced Artillery Ammunition and 
• Future Large Aircraft (FLA) 
 
Turkey also participates in the Conference of National Armaments Directors 
(CNAD), which is an organization connected to NATO Council and established in 
1966 with the objective of coordinating the armaments cooperation among NATO 
member countries and takes an active part in both the concept activities and in some 
of the joint production and procurement projects. The projects in which Turkey is 
presently participating in the scope of the CNAD are specified below 
(Undersecretaritat of Defense Industry, 2002): 
• Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) System, 
• Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) System, 
• Continuous Acquisition and Lifelong Support (CALS) System, 
• Battlefield Information Systems (BICES), 
• Tactical Communications Systems (TACOMS-POST 2000) and 
• NATO Friend or Foe Identification System (NIS) 
 
In parallel with the rapidly developing defense industry resources and capabilities, it 
is aimed for Turkey to engage in cooperation connections based on the principle of 
reciprocity with friendly and allied countries and to make concrete cooperation on 
the subjects of technology and R&D and also on the joint production and 
procurement of defense equipment. 
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CHAPTER 3 
  
                                   LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this chapter, business firm growth is covered first as a background. Next, a 
brief discussion of sustainable growth literature is presented.  The Higgins Model on 
sustainable growth concludes the chapter. 
 
3.1 Business Firm Growth 
 
All the managers of firms wish to maximize their profits from investment in 
the enterprise itself. They always have great desire to grow and to make profits. That 
is why, the main strategies in the firm are related with the growth of the firm. 
The term “growth” is often used vaguely, or with a variety of meanings. 
People talk of “growth firms”-and of paying more for a growth firm- but their 
meaning is not always clear. It sometimes denotes merely increase in amount, output, 
exports, sales etc. “At other times, it is used in primary meaning implying an increase 
in size or an improvement in quality as a result of a process of development, that is 
similar to natural biological processes in which an interacting series of internal 
changes lead to increases in size accompanied by changes in the characteristic of 
growing object” (Penrose 1995, p.1).  However, in most of the academic studies, a 
firm’s growth is decomposed into two parts: the growth resulting from the growth in 
the markets in which the firm sells its products and the growth that is achieved as a 
result of an increased market share. The source of the sales growth, market growth, 
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or share growth may influence the firm’s operating and financial targets, as well as 
its stock price relative to other firms in the industry (Clark, Thomas and Gerard, 
1989). 
Why do firms grow? It is an important question. Yet, economists and 
management people have so far failed to answer it convincingly. There are three 
main competing theories: The traditional explanation is that firms grow to reap 
economies of scale, and to increase their market power. They stop growing once they 
reach an optimum size, when they run out of profitable investment opportunities or 
become too big and bureaucratic to manage. Secondly, life-cycle theories, which 
became popular in the 1970s and 1980s, identify several stages in the growth of 
firms, including an entrepreneurial phase, maturity and finally a period of decline. A 
third view, currently fashionable, attributes firms' growth to their ``core 
competencies''. Admittedly, this is a somewhat nebulous concept. But in essence, it 
means that a firm's performance is determined by building on a set of key skills that 
distinguish it from its rivals. These might include better technology, a trusted brand 
name, or the experience of its employees (The Economist, 1999).  
Geroski (1999) determined that companies of different sizes’ growth largely 
follow a ``random walk''--an erratic and unpredictable course. There is in fact some 
evidence that smaller firms grow faster than larger ones. In particular, very small, 
very new firms tend to grow much faster than established ones. More surprisingly, 
firms' growth rates are only weakly correlated with that of the economy as a whole 
or, indeed, with that of their own industry. Recessions seem to hit only a few firms 
badly; most are largely unaffected, while some actually prosper. Geroski's finding is 
also consistent with the finding that firms are unlikely to respond to a shock 
 17 
immediately if they plan to restructure soon. They will respond only after enough 
pressure has built up to convince them that the shock is permanent and important.  
There is an interesting implication for the relation between desire to grow and 
the desire to make profits. If profits are a condition of successful growth, but profits 
are sought primarily for the sake of the firm that is, to reinvest in the firm rather than 
to pay to the owners for the use of their capital, then from the point of investment 
policy, growth and profits become equivalent as the criteria for the selection of 
investment programs (Penrose, 1995).   
There are also other objectives that are often important for the firm such as 
power, prestige, public approval or the mere love of the game (Penrose, 1995). It 
should be recognized that the attainment of these usually are not associated directly 
with the ability to make profits. Firms will never invest in expansion for the sake of 
the growth if the return on the investment is negative. Firms will never invest outside 
the firm except eventually to increase the funds available for investment in the firm. 
Therefore, increasing the total long run profits of the enterprise is equivalent to 
increasing the long run rate of growth (Penrose, 1995).   
3.2 Sustainable Growth 
The concept of "sustainable growth" is well documented in both academic and 
practitioner journals, and goes back at least to David Packard explaining how 
Hewlett-Packard grew (Klein and Belt, 1994). Specifically, given the firm’s target 
dividend payout ratio and financial structure (debt to equity), sustainable growth rate 
is the percentage increase in sales that can be maintained without necessitating a 
change in financial policy. Understanding a firm’s sustainable growth rate provides 
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information whether the firm is likely to encounter financial distress in the future. 
Some writers also have used terms such as "supportable growth" (Kisor, 1964) or 
"affordable growth" (Kyd, 1981). The notion of sustainable growth that is, perhaps, 
the most referenced version is associated with Higgins. Higgins (1970) defines 
sustainable growth as the annual percentage increase in sales "that is consistent with 
the firm's established financial policies." The firm's established financial policies 
include the dividend payout ratio and use of debt financing. Within Higgins’ 
framework, a firm experiencing growth has four ways in which to raise the additional 
funds needed to finance that growth.  
 Issue more equity  
 Reduce the dividend payout ratio 
 Increase the firm’s debt position 
 Improve the firm’s operating performance 
The debt Higgins refers to include both short and long term liabilities since 
both are typically used to finance the assets of the firm. Also, an improvement in the 
firm’s operating performance should be reflected in an increase in the firm’s net 
income and greater availability of the retained earnings. 
A number of researchers have studied the issue of sustainable growth and all 
have basically arrived at the idea that growth beyond the sustainable level forces firm 
management to make important operating and financing decisions. Sustainable 
growth can be defined (see Kisor (1964), Kyd (1981) and Higgins (1989)) as  
SUSG = ROE * (1-DPR) 
where SUSG is the sustainable growth rate, ROE is the return on equity and DPR is 
the dividend payout ratio. Thus, (1-DPR) represents the percentage of net income 
retained by a company. Actual growth beyond the sustainable level must be financed 
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in some way, and possibly in a way that requires management to change their set 
dividend and leverage policies.  
Higgins (1977) states that if a firm's sales are growing at a rate faster than 
sustainable growth rate, and if management chooses not to issue new equity, then a 
move away from set financial policies will be required to sustain the chosen level of 
growth. Typically, the financing method of choice for these faster growing firms is 
an increase in leverage. Gupta (1969) provides empirical evidence that supports 
Higgins' notions, as does Gup (1980). Furthermore, the presence of inflation will 
affect the amount of additional financing needed (Higgins (1977) and (1981); and 
Johnson, (1981)) and, thus, the ability of a company to grow. While some researchers 
have found that increased borrowing is the typical financing choice employed to 
increase growth, others indicate that it is not always the best way to increase growth. 
Ellsworth (1983) agrees with Higgins that firms can grow faster by using 
proportionately more debt, but he recommends that firms issue new equity from time 
to time to relieve financing constraints. Spraakman (1979) finds that a change in 
return on investment impacts growth more so than does a change in leverage, at least 
for certain lines of business. Pruitt and Gitman (1991), in a survey of financial 
managers of the 1000 largest U.S. firms, find that the choice of external financing 
(i.e., the issuance of debt or equity) is driven by the level of current investment 
expenditures, the degree of financial leverage, interest rate levels, and liquidity. 
 
3.3 Higgins Model 
In 1977 and 1981 Higgins demonstrated that the financial policies of many 
corporations may be at variance with their growth objective. As a guide for setting 
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compatible financial policies and growth objectives, Higgins developed a formula to 
calculate a rate of sustainable growth. In deriving his formula Higgins made the 
following assumptions (Clark, Chiang and Olson 1989, p.28): 
 
• Book depreciation is adequate to recapture the value of existing assets; 
• Profit margin (P) on new sales (S') corresponds to that of existing sales (S); 
hence, the change in sales (US) equals S'-S; 
• Firm has an established financial structure goal that is debt to equity ratio (L) 
without the sale of new common stock; 
• Firm has an established dividend payout rate (D); thus, the target retention 
ratio is (1-D); 
• New fixed assets at book value (F) represent a stated proportion of the 
change in physical volume of output  (real sales); 
• New current assets  (C) are a stated   proportion   of   sales   in nominal 
dollars; 
• Initial level of sales at the beginning of the period is represented by  (S) and 
the projected sales during the period by (S'); 
• T   denotes   the   ratio   of   total assets to net sales, and the ratio is constant 
for new and existing sales; 
• J denotes the annual inflation rate; 
• Firm will rely on retained earnings for equity financing, and new common 
stock will not be issued. 
Based upon these assumptions, Higgins describes the derivation of the basic 
formula as cited in (Clark, Chiang and Olson 1989, p. 29):  
 21 
“Assuming P and T are the same for new sales as for existing sales, the new 
assets required to support increased sales are forecast to be US(T) … On the other 
side of the balance sheet, total profits for the year are expected to be (S + US)P and 
additions to retained earnings to be (S + US)P(1—D) …  because every $1 added 
to retained earnings enables the company to borrow $L without increasing its debt to 
equity ratio.” 
Since assets must equal liabilities plus equity, additions to assets must be 
covered by an increase in retained earnings and new debt. Setting the two quantities 
equal and solving for US / S yields Expression 1 (Higgins, 1981, p. 37): 
 
(1) 
 
Unless the actual growth rate (g) equals the sustainable growth rate (g*), 
the profit margin, dividend payout ratio, debt/equity ratio or total assets/sales ratio 
must change or the firm will be compelled to issue new equities. As subsequently 
illustrated, the basic formula allows for modifications to assess the effects on sustain-
able growth of changes in prices, tax rates, and business combinations. 
Optimal growth is not simply the product of accepting all investments with a 
positive net-present value or an internal rate of return greater than a stipulated rate. 
Management has to reflect explicitly upon the implications of higher growth rates on 
established financial policies, such as dividend payouts, leveraging, and the sale of 
equities. These decisions have both financial and managerial control significance (Clark, 
Chiang and Olson, 1989). 
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Expression 1 can be modified to allow for price increases or decreases (inflation). 
This yields the following equation (Higgins, 1981, p. 38):             
                                                                                                                                            (2)                                
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Overall, given the assumptions of the model, an upward trend in prices acts 
to reduce real sustainable growth unless it is offset by operating efficiencies. In the 
extreme case, inflation induced increases in retained earnings and borrowing are 
more than offset by required increases in working capital investment. Higgins 
estimates, for example, that real sustainable growth declines by 2.2 percent for 
every 5 percent increase in the rate of inflation. He further notes:  
“To the extent that depreciation is insufficient to maintain the value of assets . 
. sustainable growth is reduced. . . .  If newly acquired assets are more profitable than 
existing assets in the sense of producing sales with a higher profit margin, offering a 
more rapid depreciation rate or generating more sales per dollar of assets . . . 
sustainable growth will rise” (Higgins, 1981, p. 36-40). 
Similarly the sustainable growth rate (g*) may rise if the firm intensifies 
asset utilization by reducing the assets required to support a given level of sales. 
Otherwise, the firm can restore its sustainable rate of growth (g*) in an inflationary 
environment only by altering accepted financial policies (reducing dividend payout, 
increasing leverage, or by selling new equity shares). All things considered, therefore, 
inflation has inimical effects on the sustainable rate of growth (g*). A growth rate 
higher than (g*) is inconsistent with established financial targets. 
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Long term planning frequently incorporates growth projections on a five- or 
ten-year basis. The objective should be to calculate a growth rate which can be 
sustained over the planning period and in the process identify the corporate 
adjustments necessary to maintain it. These may include changes in the 
debt/equity ratio, the dividend payout ratio, asset and manpower productivity, and so 
forth. These considerations loom larger in the case of business combinations where 
synergistic effects become the measure of success. 
The Higgins model provides a starting point to attack these issues. It also 
clearly delineates the effects of price changes and tax ratios on sustainable growth 
calculated from a given price level. The difficulty with the Higgins model is its heavy 
reliance on accounting numbers, which are subject to the exercise of a variety of 
options and which have an uncertain link to the market value of the firm's common 
stock. Also, accounting numbers are historic in nature and reflect transactions 
executed at different price levels. Accounting data lags price trends, on both the upside 
and downside (Clark, 1985). 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
 
 
 
4.1 Data 
 
 
In this study, using Higgins’ concept, the real and sustainable growth rate of 
defense firms are identified between the years 1997-2001. How defense firms 
financed growth in sales and assets during the period is examined. The factors that 
affect the growth rate of the defense firms are clarified and the issue of how they 
should finance growth in accordance with the sustainable growth rate is discussed. 
The sample contains 17 defense companies (annual balance sheets, Income 
statements and cash flow statements) during the period 1997 and 2001. Data of 14 
defense companies are obtained from The Turkish Armed Forces Foundation and the 
other three from ISE. The statistical calculations are made using 85 data points for 
the five-year period. Although the sample size seems to be small, it generally reflects 
the financial situation of the defense industry since the sample includes major 
leading defense companies that Turkish Armed Forces Foundation has shares in. The 
sample has 2 firms in weapon and ammunition sector, 3 firms in aircraft 
manufacturing, 6 firms in electronic, 5 firms in machine manufacturing and 1 firm in 
oil shipping sector. According to Defense Industry Association, about 40% of the 
sales of defense firms in Turkey are directly related to defense products. Unadjusted 
and inflation adjusted percentage change of the net sales and total assets of defense 
firms are given in Table-1, 2 and Table-3, 4. Unadjusted and adjusted mean and 
median of sales and total assets of defense firms are shown in Table-5 and Table-6. 
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Table 1: Sales of Defense Firms (Unadjusted Percentage Change)  
COMPANIES 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
ALCATEL  100% 204,42% 285,80% 434,35% 873,01% 
ASELSAN  100% 173,60% 313,15% 536,56% 997,98% 
ASPİLSAN 100% 145,79% 161,85% 276,33% 297,51% 
ÇANSAŞ  100% 228,93% 516,04% 532,24% 417,57% 
DITAS  100% 157,50% 194,38% 400,19% 756,63% 
HAVELSAN RADAR 100% 118,44% 374,59% 405,06% 971,48% 
HAVELSAN TEKNOLOJI 100% 324,31% 244,40% 490,81% 576,49% 
İŞBİR 100% 159,09% 301,98% 529,22% 525,24% 
MERCEDES-BENZ 100% 134,71% 147,50% 345,60% 360,10% 
NETAŞ 100% 135,35% 236,38% 368,54% 393,02% 
OTOKAR 100% 243,50% 439,88% 661,58% 646,58% 
PARSAN 100% 147,94% 168,02% 333,40% 343,97% 
PETLAS 100% 194,33% 317,59% 407,80% 498,30% 
ROKETSAN 100% 685,76% 590,62% 1458,19% 5216,46% 
TAİ 100% 132,12% 188,94% 178,78% 713,98% 
TEİ 100% 183,87% 387,80% 832,49% 1989,60% 
TUSAŞ - 100% 261,75% 454,87% 937,76% 
TOTAL 100% 160,13% 221,89% 408,95% 622,87% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Sales of Defense Firms (Inflation Adjusted Percentage Change)  
COMPANIES 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
ALCATEL  100% 118,97% 108,57% 109,18% 135,77% 
ASELSAN  100% 101,04% 118,96% 134,87% 155,20% 
ASPİLSAN 100% 84,85% 61,48% 69,46% 46,27% 
ÇANSAŞ  100% 133,24% 196,03% 68,25% 64,94% 
DITAS  100% 91,66% 73,84% 100,59% 117,67% 
HAVELSAN RADAR 100% 68,93% 142,30% 101,82% 151,08% 
HAVELSAN TEKNOLOJI 100% 188,75% 92,84% 123,37% 89,65% 
İŞBİR 100% 92,59% 114,71% 133,02% 81,68% 
MERCEDES-BENZ 100% 78,40% 56,03% 86,87% 56,00% 
NETAŞ 100% 78,77% 89,79% 92,64% 61,12% 
OTOKAR 100% 141,72% 167,10% 166,29% 100,55% 
PARSAN 100% 86,10% 63,83% 83,80% 53,49% 
PETLAS 100% 113,10% 120,64% 102,51% 77,49% 
ROKETSAN 100% 399,11% 224,36% 366,53% 811,25% 
TAİ 100% 76,89% 71,77% 44,94% 111,04% 
TEİ 100% 107,01% 147,32% 209,26% 309,42% 
TUSAŞ - 100% 170,85% 196,45% 250,58% 
TOTAL 100% 92,90% 84,29% 102,79% 96,87% 
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Table 3: Total Assets of Defense Firms (Unadjusted Percentage Change)  
COMPANIES 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
ALCATEL  100% 222,53% 396,88% 443,54% 923,01% 
ASELSAN  100% 179,44% 328,70% 561,87% 910,23% 
ASPİLSAN 100% 154,51% 210,77% 251,06% 337,50% 
ÇANSAŞ  100% 195,24% 235,04% 319,70% 526,88% 
DITAS  100% 121,45% 305,60% 324,30% 1666,30% 
HAVELSAN RADAR 100% 274,88% 359,87% 230,97% 442,64% 
HAVELSAN TEKNOLOJİ 100% 39,92% 80,67% 56,06% 119,01% 
İŞBİR 100% 167,61% 448,77% 833,50% 788,99% 
MERCEDES-BENZ 100% 149,07% 218,26% 308,70% 459,35% 
NETAŞ 100% 146,89% 296,20% 379,92% 583,31% 
OTOKAR 100% 313,46% 622,74% 805,78% 1503,63% 
PARSAN 100% 217,85% 278,48% 507,29% 670,49% 
PETLAS 100% 172,51% 245,72% 351,68% 490,62% 
ROKETSAN 100% 138,95% 482,05% 837,85% 1615,12% 
TAİ 100% 193,55% 493,65% 446,40% 842,52% 
TEİ 100% 176,35% 291,43% 506,12% 944,46% 
TUSAŞ 100% 521,35% 676,65% 751,48% 939,83% 
TOTAL 100% 169,65% 351,32% 500,10% 880,69% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMPANIES 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
ALCATEL  100% 129,51% 150,77% 111,49% 143,54% 
ASELSAN  100% 104,43% 124,87% 141,23% 141,56% 
ASPİLSAN 100% 89,93% 80,07% 63,11% 52,49% 
ÇANSAŞ  100% 113,63% 89,29% 80,36% 81,94% 
DITAS  100% 70,68% 116,09% 81,52% 259,14% 
HAVELSAN RADAR 100% 159,98% 136,71% 58,06% 68,84% 
HAVELSAN TEKNOLOJİ 100% 23,24% 30,64% 14,09% 18,51% 
İŞBİR 100% 97,55% 170,48% 209,51% 122,70% 
MERCEDES-BENZ 100% 86,76% 82,91% 77,59% 71,44% 
NETAŞ 100% 85,49% 112,52% 95,50% 90,71% 
OTOKAR 100% 182,43% 236,57% 202,54% 233,84% 
PARSAN 100% 126,79% 105,79% 127,51% 104,27% 
PETLAS 100% 100,40% 93,35% 88,40% 76,30% 
ROKETSAN 100% 80,87% 183,12% 210,60% 251,18% 
TAİ 100% 112,65% 187,52% 112,21% 131,03% 
TEİ 100% 102,64% 110,71% 127,22% 146,88% 
TUSAŞ 100% 303,43% 257,04% 188,89% 146,16% 
TOTAL 100% 98,74% 133,46% 125,70% 136,96% 
Table 4: Total Assets of Defense Firms (Inflation Adjusted Percentage Change) 
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Table 5: Mean and Median of Net Sales and Total Assets 
 (TL millions, Unadjusted)   
  Net Sales Total Assets 
  Mean Median Mean Median 
1997 16.752.732 5.260.607 16.950.548 6.185.830 
1998 26.825.677 10.935.458 28.757.076 15.925.309 
1999 37.172.032 21.807.016 59.550.814 26.316.963 
2000 68.510.066 29.493.337 84.769.286 45.704.354 
2001 104.348.203 74.092.618 149.281.526 85.287.654 
 
 
 
Table 6: Mean and Median of Net Sales and Total Assets 
 (TL millions, Inflation Adjusted)   
  Net Sales Total Assets 
  Mean Median Mean Median 
1997 28.118 8.829 28.450 10.382 
1998 26.205 10.682 28.091 15.557 
1999 23.701 13.904 37.969 16.779 
2000 28.904 12.443 35.763 19.282 
2001 27.237 19.340 38.966 22.262 
 
 
4.2 Methodology 
 
In this study, first some common ratios in the literature are used and a trend 
analysis is made to identify the financial performance of the defense firms for the 
five-year period. Then, using Higgins’ concept, the actual and sustainable growth 
rate of defense firms are determined and how defense firms financed that growth is 
examined. Finally, panel data analysis is used to clarify the determinants of growth 
of Turkish Defense Industry. The analysis contains: 
• Return-on-asset (ROA) performance of the defense industry for the 
five-year period 
• Return-on-equity (ROE) performance of the defense industry for the 
five-year period 
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• Trend Analysis 
• Percentage change in sales for the five-year period 
• Percentage change in total assets for the five-year period 
• Percentage change in short-term debt for the five-year period 
• Percentage change in long-term debt for the five-year period 
• Percentage change in total debt for the five-year period 
• Percentage change in equity for the five-year period 
• Sustainable Growth Rate (without inflation effect) for the five-year 
period  
• Sustainable Growth Rate (with inflation effect) for the five-year period  
• Panel Data analysis to clarify the determinants of growth of defense 
industry 
 
ROA Performance: In this section, first the ratio of operating return on sales 
is calculated to understand the profitability of sales in defense industry. Then, net 
assets (total assets less accounts payable and accruals) to net sales and asset turnover 
ratios are calculated to determine how efficiently assets are managed by relating 
asset items to sales. Finally, the two analyses are tied together into a return-on-asset 
measure to clarify how well management has deployed the assets. 
ROE Performance: Initially, the operating income effect that is, operating 
return less interest expense and taxes divided by equity, is determined. The analysis 
focuses solely on operating activities and excludes all financing factors to gain an 
understanding of the profitability of operations; the revenues and costs involved in 
the core business of the industry. Second, non-operating income effect that is, gains 
and losses from non-operating activities and extraordinary activities, are determined. 
Then, return-on-equity ratio and financial leverage ratios (short-term debt to equity 
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and long-term debt to equity) are calculated to clarify the effect of debt financing on 
common equity. Finally, a trend analysis is made and the percentage change in sales, 
operating and non-operating income are examined between the years 1997-2001. 
Wholesale price index (total-general) is used as deflator in the calculations. The 
formulas of the selected ratios are given in the appendix. 
The Actual and Sustainable Growth: In this section, sustainable growth rate 
of defense industry is calculated and the effect of inflation on the sustainable growth 
rate is determined first. Then, the actual growth rate on sales, assets, debt and equity 
are calculated. The first two items, sales and assets, are used to assess growth. The 
next two items, debt and equity, are used to see how defense firms decided to finance 
growth that is either higher or lower than the sustainable growth rate. If the 
sustainable growth rate is bracketed by actual growth rates for sales and assets, it is 
assumed that the defense firms can sustain their actual growth rate without 
encountering financial difficulties. If the sustainable rate is less than both the actual 
growth rates for sales and assets, it is concluded that without access to new capital, 
the defense firms will probably face financial difficulties in the near future. If capital 
suppliers dry up, the firms must slow their actual growth, increase their sustainable 
growth, or a combination of these two approaches (Gallinger, 2000). If sustainable 
growth exceeds both actual growth in sales and assets over two or three consecutive 
years, then maybe managers are missing opportunities in the defense firm's markets 
to capture more sales, profits and cash flows. The firms are possibly losing market 
share to the competitors. If this situation is not corrected, the firms may become the 
target of a takeover or merger.  
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Panel (Pool) Data Analysis: A Firm-level panel data analysis (fixed effect 
model) is used for assessing the impact of some financial ratios, GNP growth and 
inflation on actual growth rate of defense firms.  
Outliers:  In the study, the financial ratios and growth rates are shown in 
tables with/out outliers eliminated. Outliers are detected in SPSS and measurements 
that fall beyond a distance of 1,5 interquartile ranges from the hinges are considered 
to be outliers. Some companies’ ratios in the sample are considered to be outliers 
because of their high losses in changing years. 
In the calculations of some ratios and growth rates, the number of data used is 
less than 85. For example, in the calculations of sales growth, 83 data points are used 
since one company in the sample does not have any sales in 1997. Also, while 
calculating the growth in long-term debt, 84 data points are used since an other 
company in the sample used TL47 trillion long-term debts in 2001 although it had 
used only TL1,7 billion in 2000, so it is considered to be outlier to prevent the whole 
sample average being affected by this specific high growth rate in long term-debts. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
 
This chapter discusses the results of some common ratios and the sustainable 
growth mentioned in the previous chapter.  Initially, ROA and ROE performance of 
Turkish Defense Firms are examined. Then, a trend analysis is made to identify the 
financial performance of the defense firms for the five-year period. Furthermore, 
using Higgins’ concept, the actual and sustainable growth rate of defense firms is 
determined and how defense firms financed that growth is examined. Consequently, 
panel data analysis is used to clarify the determinants of growth of Turkish Defense 
Industry.  
 
5.1 Return On Asset Performance 
 
The results of profitability and efficiency in managing assets of defense firms 
are given in Table-7. 
Table 7: ROA Performance of Defense Industry      
YEARS   1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Mean 0,076 -0,045 0,114 0,038 0,073 
OPERATING RETURN ON SALES Median 0,189 0,131 0,105 0,082 0,107 
Mean 2,057 1,447 1,961 1,612 1,397 
NET ASSETS TO NET SALES Median 1,099 1,085 0,972 0,797 0,971 
Mean 1,427 1,675 1,684 1,890 1,284 
ASSET TURNOVER RATIO Median 0,910 0,926 1,033 1,260 1,056 
Mean 0,150 0,092 0,180 0,097 0,098 
RETURN ON ASSETS BEFORE TAXES Median 0,198 0,171 0,136 0,156 0,114 
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The net result of the analysis is that it reveals fluctuating trend in the 
operating profitability of defense industry between 1997-2000 and a slightly 
downward trend in 2001 compared with 1997- going from an average profit of 0,076 
liras per sales TL in 1997 to an average profit of 0,073 liras per sales TL in 2001 
(Table-4).  This performance is consistent with the net sales (deflated) by defense 
firms. In 1997, deflated net sales were TL 478007 million and had declined to 
463031 million by 2001. 
Defense firms have reduced their investments in net assets-total assets less 
accounts payable and accruals- by TL0,66; going from TL2,057 per sales TL in 1997 
to TL1,397 per sales TL in 2001. Asset turnover ratio improved between 1997-2000 
and declined in 2001. The generally accepted standard for this ratio varies between 
businesses and industries. For manufacturing firms, a value between two and four is 
acceptable (Bektöre, 1998). Since most of the firms in the sample are manufacturing 
ones, their ratios are expected to be between two and four but all the ratios are below 
two. So it indicates that defense firms’ assets are not fully employed. 
The profit generated by the use of the assets of the business is measured by 
ROA ratio. A high ROA ratio indicates good performance or effective use of firm’s 
assets by management. Then, a low ROA ratio will indicate poor performance or 
ineffective employment of the assets by management (Gill, 1990). While the defense 
firms were making a profit of 15% on invested net assets in 1997, it declined to 9,8% 
in 2001. Although the decline on operating return on sales is only 0,3% between 
1997-2001, the relatively high decline of 5,2% on ROA resulted from the decline of 
14% on asset turnover ratio. 
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The overall annual results of defense firms using all data for the five-year 
period are given in Table-8 and the results with outliers eliminated are given in 
Table-9. 
 
 
  
Table 8: ROA Performance of Defense Industry      
  Max. Min. Mean Median Mode Std. dev. 
OPERATING RETURN ON SALES 0,364 -2,273 -0,018 0,108 -0,040 0,460 
NET ASSETS TO NET SALES 76,66 0,116 3,443 1,023 0,490 9,692 
ASSET TURNOVER RATIO 8,647 0,013 1,517 0,977 0,350 1,609 
RETURN ON ASSETS BEFORE TAXES 0,857 -0,761 0,115 0,143 -0,030 0,237 
(no outliers eliminated)        
Table 9: ROA Performance of Defense Industry      
  Max. Min. Mean Median Mode Std. dev. 
OPERATING RETURN ON SALES 0,36 -0,19 0,128 0,122 -0,040 0,122 
NET ASSETS TO NET SALES 1,94 0,116 0,816 0,699 0,490 0,479 
ASSET TURNOVER RATIO 3,07 0,013 1,040 0,879 0,350 0,781 
RETURN ON ASSETS BEFORE TAXES 0,51 -0,32 0,144 0,167 -0,030 0,158 
(outliers eliminated)        
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When the whole data is used in the calculations, the range between the 
calculated means and medians are so wide, the standard deviations are so high, and 
therefore there are outliers because of the some extreme results of different defense 
firms in changing years. Eliminating the outliers, it is seen that the annual return of 
defense firms on sales is 12,8%, the annual asset turnover ratio is 1,040 times and the 
annual ROA before taxes is 14,4% for the five-year period. Defense firms would 
have been better off to turnover the assets more than twice a year. Doing so would 
have resulted in a higher return on assets.  
 
5.2 Return On Equity Performance 
 
The overall annual results of defense firms using all data for the five-year 
period are given in Table-10 and the results with outliers eliminated are given in 
Table-11. 
Table 10: ROE Performance of Defense Industry      
  Max. Min. Mean Median Mode Std. dev. 
OPERATING INCOME EFFECT 5,960 -14,550 -0,413 -0,011 0,110 2,408 
NON-OPERATING INCOME EFFECT 3,800 -12,520 -0,031 0,155 0,070 1,812 
RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY 0,740 -16,770 -0,445 0,223 0,240 2,780 
SHORT TERM DEBT TO EQUITY 20,850 0,010 2,060 1,101 0,010 3,264 
LONG TERM DEBT TO EQUITY 15,200 0 0,994 0,190 0 2,604 
TOTAL DEBT TO EQUITY 31,220 0,040 3,054 1,512 0,040 5,201 
(no outliers eliminated)        
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ROE is a comprehensive indicator of a firm’s performance because it 
provides an indication of how well managers are employing the funs invested by the 
firm’s shareholders to generate returns (Palepu, 1996). 
In an effort to gain as much insight as possible into the industry’s 
performance, the non-operating effects are separated from normal activities. The 
operating income effect is the operating return less interest expense and taxes divided 
by equity. The non-operating income effect includes the gain and losses from non-
operating and extraordinary activities. 
In the test period, ROE ratios, calculated by using whole data, display a wide 
range from –1600,77% to 74% since two of the defense firms in the sample had high 
losses in 1998 as a result of large increases in their interest expenses. The maximum 
debt to equity ratios also belong to both firms. 
Eliminating the outliers, over the five-year period the sample had an average 
annual ROE of 23,4% and 20,5% of the return resulted from non-operating activities. 
Table 11: ROE Performance of Defense Industry      
  Max. Min. Mean Median Mode Std. dev. 
OPERATING INCOME EFFECT 0,42 -0,4 0,022 0,050 0,110 0,182 
NON-OPERATING INCOME EFFECT 0,83 -0,33 0,205 0,155 0,070 0,242 
RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY 0,74 -0,3 0,234 0,247 0,240 0,214 
SHORT TERM DEBT TO EQUITY 5,04 0,01 1,334 0,943 0,010 1,260 
LONG TERM DEBT TO EQUITY 0,48 0 0,151 0,119 0,000 0,136 
TOTAL DEBT TO EQUITY 4,95 0,04 1,479 1,070 0,040 1,278 
(outliers eliminated)        
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The operating return on equity of 2,2% was too low since the high interest expenses 
used in operating activities affected the return unfavorably.  
Debt to equity ratio, indicating the firm’s capital structure, is also a measure 
of the financial risk associated with the common stocks. This ratio with some 
shortcomings is widely used as an indicator of lenders’ risks (Lev, 1974). In general 
accepted standard for this ratio is one (Sevilengül, 1993). If the ratio is high, it means 
that lenders are having greater risk and firm’s ability to obtain money from outside 
resources is limited. On the contrary, if the ratio is low it can be assumed that the 
firm has flexibility to get credit and lenders’ have less risk, but still the firm is not 
reaching its full profit potential. 
The sample had an average annual total debt to equity ratio of 1,479 that is 
higher than the general accepted standard of 1 and this resulted from the high level of 
short-term debt to equity ratio of 1,334. The average annual long-term debt to equity 
ratio over the five-year period is only 0,151. This indicates that the defense firms, as 
the other firms in different industries in Turkey, have difficulties in finding long-term 
debts and they have to rely on short-term debts heavily to finance their activities and 
to be compatible in the market, but this financing strategy make the defense firms 
face with financing problems in the following years. 
Making an analysis to understand the effect of sole operating activities, a 
trend analysis is shown in Table-13 and Table-14. The percentage change in sales, 
operating and non-operating income are examined between the years 1997-2001. In 
this analysis, earnings from operating activities include sole earnings from operating 
activities and earnings from non-operating activities include gains and losses from 
non-operating activities and interest expenses. Wholesale price index (total-general) 
is used as the deflator in the calculations. 
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Table-12: Annual Earnings (million TL)     
INDUSTRY 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
NET SALES 478007 444084 402910 491360 463031 
COST OF GOODS SOLD -340369 -323542 -289165 -375326 -340886 
OPERATING EXPENSES -47437 -57451 -69344 -75663 -63935 
EARNINGS FROM OPERATING ACT. 90201 63091 44401 40371 58210 
EARNINGS FROM NON-OPER. ACT. 10191 23537 31248 4678 -27737 
EXTRAORDINARY EARNINGS -3579 -5375 -4897 -2363 -8992 
TAXES -45773 -33485 -25013 -18471 -12618 
NET EARNINGS AFTER TAXES 51040 47769 45739 24215 8863 
Data is deflated by using wholesale price index (1994)    
 
Table-13: Vertical Analysis      
INDUSTRY 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
NET SALES 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
COST OF GOODS SOLD -71,21% -72,86% -71,77% -76,39% -73,62% 
OPERATING EXPENSES -9,92% -12,94% -17,21% -15,40% -13,81% 
EARNINGS FROM OPERATING ACT. 18,87% 14,21% 11,02% 8,22% 12,57% 
EARNINGS FROM NON-OPER. ACT. 2,13% 5,30% 7,76% 0,95% -5,99% 
EXTRAORDINARY EARNINGS -0,75% -1,21% -1,22% -0,48% -1,94% 
TAXES -9,58% -7,54% -6,21% -3,76% -2,73% 
NET EARNINGS AFTER TAXES 10,68% 10,76% 11,35% 4,93% 1,91% 
 
Table-14: Horizontal Analysis      
INDUSTRY 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
NET SALES 100% 92,90% 84,29% 102,79% 96,87% 
COST OF GOODS SOLD 100% 95,06% 84,96% 110,27% 100,15% 
OPERATING EXPENSES 100% 121,11% 146,18% 159,50% 134,78% 
EARNINGS FROM OPER. ACT. 100% 69,95% 49,22% 44,76% 64,53% 
EARNINGS FROM NON-OPER.ACT. 100% 230,96% 306,61% 45,90% -272,16% 
EXTRAORDINARY EARNINGS -100% -150,19% -136,84% -66,03% -251,27% 
TAXES 100% 73,15% 54,65% 40,35% 27,57% 
NET EARNINGS AFTER TAXES 100% 93,59% 89,61% 47,44% 17,36% 
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In the test period, sales of defense firms had a fluctuating trend. Although the 
highest sales level of 102,79% occurred in 2000, the least earnings level of 44,76% 
from operating activities also occurred in the same year because of the highest costs 
of goods sold and operating expenses during the period. Since the defense firms, 
especially electronics firms, import raw materials and machines from abroad, the 
increase in exchange rates also caused an increase in total costs of the defense firms 
and resulted as a decline in profit margins. Although the earnings from operating 
activities, with the level of 64,53%, increased slightly in 2001, the net earnings after 
taxes had a declining trend over the test period since the earnings from non-operating 
activities declined to the negative level of –272,16%. In fact, until 1999, earnings 
from non-operating activities had a positive and increasing trend but, after the 1999 
crisis, it dropped dramatically to negative levels. This is mainly because of high 
interest expenses as a result of short-term debt financing strategy that defense firms 
had used before the crisis. The high increase in exchange rates doubled the short-
term debts and interest expenses, therefore, the defense firms could not cover the 
interest expenses and found themselves in financial distress. The extraordinary 
earnings were in negative values during the five-year period and it declined to the 
negative level of –251,27% in 2001. The lowest level of earnings after taxes also 
occurred in 2001 with the level of 17,36%. 
 
5.3 Sustainable Growth 
 
The sustainable growth rate of defense industry is calculated and the effect of 
inflation on the sustainable growth rate is determined first. Then, the actual growth 
rate on sales, assets, debt and equity are calculated. The first two items, sales and 
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assets, are used to assess growth. The next two items, debt and equity, are used to see 
how defense firms decided to finance growth that is either higher or lower than the 
sustainable growth rate. The sustainable growth rate of defense industry with/out 
inflation effect and the actual growth rate on sales, assets, debt and equity are shown 
in Table-15 and Table-16. 
 
 
Table-15: Annual Growth Rate for The Five-Year Period      
 INDUSTRY Max. Min. Mean Median Mode Std. Dev. 
SUSTAINABLE GROWTH (without inflation effect) 2,812 -0,944 0,184 0,183 -0,080 0,526 
SUSTAINABLE GROWTH (with inflation effect) 2,264 -0,967 -0,112 -0,127 -0,130 0,439 
ACTUAL GROWTH IN SALES* 2,991 -0,515 0,118 0,083 0,240 0,504 
ACTUAL GROWTH IN ASSETS* 4,130 -0,770 0,156 0,020 0,160 0,631 
ACTUAL GROWTH IN SHORT-TERM DEBT* 5,110 -0,870 0,261 -0,003 -0,870 0,948 
ACTUAL GROWTH IN LONG-TERM DEBT* 4,710 -1 0,187 0,142 0 0,733 
ACTUAL GROWTH IN TOTAL DEBT* 6,190 -0,900 0,268 0,049 -0,900 0,943 
ACTUAL GROWTH IN EQUITY* 2,400 -0,630 0,102 -0,00291 -0,180 0,519 
(no outliers eliminated)        
* Data is deflated by using wholesale price index        
Table-16: Annual Growth Rate for The Five-Year Period      
 INDUSTRY Max. Min. Mean Median Mode Std. dev. 
SUSTAINABLE GROWTH (without inflation effect) 0,680 -0,390 0,191 0,188 -0,080 0,238 
SUSTAINABLE GROWTH (with inflation effect) 0,280 -0,560 -0,112 -0,123 -0,130 0,171 
ACTUAL GROWTH IN SALES* 1,064 -0,515 0,051 0,068 0,240 0,341 
ACTUAL GROWTH IN ASSETS* 0,670 -0,570 0,017 -0,003 0,160 0,255 
ACTUAL GROWTH IN SHORT-TERM DEBT* 1,330 -0,870 0,062 -0,045 -0,870 0,519 
ACTUAL GROWTH IN LONG-TERM DEBT* 0,520 -0,310 0,099 0,142 0 0,183 
ACTUAL GROWTH IN TOTAL DEBT* 1,340 -0,900 0,107 0,043 -0,900 0,463 
ACTUAL GROWTH IN EQUITY* 0,430 -0,470 -0,038 -0,032 -0,180 0,200 
(outliers eliminated)        
* Data is deflated by using wholesale price index       
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The financial definition of sustainable growth is the rate of growth in sales, 
assets, debt and equity that can be sustained indefinitely without management 
altering the debt-to-equity relationship, the return-on-equity performance or the 
dividend payout rate (Gallinger, 2000). Understanding a firm's sustainable growth 
rate provides a peek into whether the firm is likely to encounter financial distress in 
the future. Firms that file bankruptcy are the ones, with minor exceptions, which 
grow too quickly. The primary reason for these companies' troubles is that their 
profits and cash flows failed to follow their strong sales growth.  
According to Higgins’ estimation that is based on his research on U.S. 
manufacturing in 1974, the real sustainable growth declines by 2.2 percent for 
every 5 percent increase in the rate of inflation. Higgins concluded that: 
“Roughly speaking, the real sustainable growth rate declines by 2,2% for 
every 5% increase in the inflation rate. With approximate 10% inflation rate in 
1974, real sustainable growth falls from an inflation-free 10,5% to 6,1%. For 
comparison, the actual real growth in manufacturing sales in 1974 was 3,8%, while 
figures for the prior two years were 8,2% and 8,4%” (Higgins 1981, p. 38). 
Using Higgins’ Formulation (Expression 1), the annual sustainable growth 
rate (without inflation effect) of defense industry for the five-year period is 18,4%. 
When we consider the effect of inflation on sustainable growth rate, using Higgins’ 
Formulation (Expression 2), as it is expected, the inflation has an unfavorable effect 
on growth and the annual sustainable growth rate of the defense industry declines to 
–11,2%. Since the annual inflation rate for the five-year period is 64%, according to 
Higgins’ estimation, it should create a decline of 28,2% on sustainable growth rate. 
The real decline on the sustainable growth rate of defense firms is 29,6% and that is 
approximately consistent with Higgins estimation. Although the real sustainable 
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growth rate of defense industry without inflation effect is acceptable, the high 
inflation rate diminishes the real sustainable growth rate of defense industry and 
defense firms financially get in trouble to survive. 
The real sustainable growth rate of defense industry is less than both the 
actual growth for sales and assets in the test period that is, defense industry has 
grown faster than its annual sustainable growth rate during the five-year period. 
Defense industry could sustain a negative annual growth rate of 11,2% far into the 
future without encountering financial difficulties. Actual growth rates exceeded the  
-11,2% sustainable rate. This indicates that, without access to new capital, the 
defense firms will probably face financial difficulties in the near future. If capital 
suppliers dry up, the firms must slow their actual growth, increase their sustainable 
growth, or a combination of these two approaches. 
The next two items, debt and equity, are used to see how management 
decided to finance growth that is either higher or lower than the sustainable growth 
rate. Defense firms’ primary source of financing is debt, specifically short-term debt, 
to support the higher than sustainable growth rate. The annual actual growth rate in 
excess of sustainable growth was supported by a 10,7% annual increase in debt 
financing. The annual increase in equity financing of defense firms for the five-year 
period is -3,8% that is, defense firms reduced the level of equity financing and used a 
large dose of debt financing, compared to equity financing, to support the growth in 
sales and assets. 
The overall conclusion to draw from the sustainable growth analysis is that 
most of the defense firms are facing serious financial distress today and will probably 
continue to face financial difficulties in the near future. The firms must slow their 
actual growth or increase their sustainable growth and should reduce the level of debt 
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financing; especially short-term debt financing and should increase their equity 
financing. Government should also support national defense firms by providing long-
term debt to make them survive in an inflationary environment. 
 
5.4 Panel (Pool) Data Analysis 
 
 A Firm-level panel data analysis is used for assessing the impact of some 
financial ratios, GNP growth and inflation on actual growth rate of defense firms. 
The model to be estimated is: 
itiitit ευβα ++Χ+=Υ  
 
for i units, i=1,...,n and for each i, t=1,....,T of which Ti periods are actually 
observed. Since we would like to utilize the information that certain sets of 
observations came from certain units, the fixed-effects model is used that we are 
interested in the coefficients β  and α . We also assume that the υi are fixed 
quantities. In other words, we model 
( ) ititiit εβυα +Χ++=Υ  
 
allowing for different intercepts for our units, but constraining the slopes to be the 
same across units.  
For assessing the impact of financial ratios, GNP growth and inflation on 
growth, the following pooled models are specified. Dummy variables are used to 
determine the yearly effect on growth: 
 
(3) 
(4) 
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itYYYYYGRit εβββββα ++++++= 54321 0100999897  
itINFGNPGRit εββα +++= 21  
• GRit represents the real sale growth, the dependent variable,  
• OPit is the increase in operating income,  
• NOPIit is the increase in non-operating income,  
• SDERit is the short-term debt to equity ratio,  
• LDERit is the long term debt to equity ratio,  
• TAGit is the total asset growth,  
• GNPit is the increase in GNP  
• INFit is the annual Whole Sale Price Index rate of inflation.  
 
Y98,….,Y01 are the dummy variables used to determine the yearly effect on 
growth. The defense firms in the sample are divided into four groups according to 
their sales volume: Group-1: sales greater than TL200 trillion; Group-2: between 
TL100 and TL200 trillion; Group-3: between TL20 and TL100 trillion; Group-4: less 
than TL20 trillion. There are three outliers in sales growth rates of the whole sample 
that adversely affect the analysis and thus are dropped. The Stata outputs for the 
descriptive statistics of the variables are in Table-17 and test results using fixed 
effects model are in Table-18. 
(5) 
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In terms of goodness to fit, it is the R-sq within that is directly relevant; our 
R-sq is 0,2236. If we use these estimates to fit the overall data, our R-sq is 0,2072. 
 As it is expected, the operating income has a positive effect on defense 
firms’ growth with the coefficient of 0,0319 that is statistically significant. The 
coefficient is small since the high interest expense reduces the positive effect of 
operating income on growth. The non-operating income also has a positive effect on 
growth with the coefficient of 0,0237, however this positive effect is not statistically 
significant.  
Table-17: Descriptive Statistics of 
Variables   
Variable Obs. Mean   Std. dev. Min. Max. 
GR 80 0,051 0,341 -0,515 1,064 
OPI 80 -0,614 4,659 -26,423 13,812 
NOPI 80 0,320 2,079 -6,597 8,155 
SDER 80 2,113 3,342 0,014 20,847 
LDER 80 0,994 2,669 0 15,196 
TAG 80 0,137 0,613 -0,768 4,131 
GNP 80 0,006 0,071 -0,094 0,083 
INF 80 0,640 0,117 0,511 0,821 
Table 18: Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs           =     80 
Group variable (i) : id   Number of groups     =       4 
      
R-sq:             within      = 0,2236  Obs per group:  min  =    15 
                      between  = 0,0007                             avg  =     20 
                      overall     = 0,2072                             max =     23 
      
    F(5,71)                        =      4,09 
    Prob > F                     =       0,0025 
      
GR           Coef.     Std. Err. t          P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
OPI    0,0319 0,0081 3,95 0,000     0,0158    0,0481 
NOPI   0,0237 0,0192 1,23 0,222    -0,0146     0,0620 
SDER   -0,0291 0,0137 -2,12 0,037    -0,0565   -0,0018 
LDER   0,0167 0,0184 0,91 0,366    -0,0199    0,0534 
TAG   0,0013 0,0626 0,02 0,983   -0,1236    0,1263 
cons    0,1081 0,0430 2,51 0,014    0,0222    0,1940 
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The short-term debt to equity ratio has a negative effect on defense firms’ 
growth with the coefficient of –0,0291 that is statistically significant (p=0,037). The 
defense firms relied on short-debt financing and reduced the level of equity 
financing; therefore they suffered from the high interest expenses that diminished the 
defense firms’ growth in the test period. 
The long-term debt to equity ratio and total asset growth have positive effects 
on growth, however these effects are not statistically significant. We also wanted to 
look at yearly effect by using dummy variables (Table-19). Except the year 2000, 
other three years have negative effects on growth, however these effects are not 
statistically significant, either. For assessing the impact of both GNP growth and 
inflation on defense firms’ growth, we built a regression model and we found that 
both items do not have significant effects on growth (Table-20). Since the operating 
income has positive effect on growth that is statistically significant, the operating 
income of defense firms is used as the dependent variable in a regression model to 
examine the effect of GNP growth and inflation on operating income. The Stata 
output for the regression model is in Table-21. 
 
Table 19: Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs              =       80 
Group variable (i) : id  Number of groups        =         4 
      
R-sq:                within       = 0,0475 Obs per group:    min   =        15 
                         between   = 0,1223                              avg   =         20 
                         overall     = 0,0480                             max   =         23 
      
   F(4,72)                           =           0,90 
   Prob > F                        =           0,4700 
      
GR           Coef.       Std. Err. t       P>|t|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
Y98    -0,0509 0,1246 -0,41 0,684 -0,2993    0,1975 
Y99   -0,0182 0,1207 -0,15 0,880 -0,2589    0,2225 
Y00     0,0276 0,1207 0,23 0,820 -0,2131    0,2683 
Y01   -0,1864 0,1249 -1,49 0,140 -0,4355    0,0627 
cons      0,0939 0,0867 1,08 0,282 -0,0789    0,2668 
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Table 20: Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs           =         80 
Group variable (i) : id   Number of groups     =           4 
      
R-sq:             within       = 0.0343  Obs per group: min    =       15 
                      between   = 0.1081                            avg    =        20 
                      overall      = 0.0346                            max   =        23 
      
    F(2,74)                         =          1,32 
    Prob > F                      =          0,2746 
      
GR          Coef.       Std. Err. t       P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
GNP        0,9974       0,6160 1,62 0,110 -0,2300    2,2248 
INF       -0,2977      0,3669 -0,81 0,420 -1,0288     0,4333 
cons        0,2340    0,2346 1 0,322 -0,2335   0,7017 
 
 
 
 
 In terms of interpretation, GNP had a positive effect on operating income in 
the test period with the coefficient of 24,0098 that is statistically significant. The 
inflation had a negative effect on operating income, however that is not statistically 
significant.  
 
 
 
Table 21: Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs            =  80 
Group variable (i) : id   Number of groups      =    4 
      
R-sq:                within      = 0,1149  Obs per group:   min  =  15 
                         between  = 0,0863                              avg  =  20 
                         overall     = 0,1097                              max =  23 
      
    F(2,74)                         =     4,80 
 Prob > F                      =     0,0109 
      
OPI Coef. Std. Err t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
GNP 24,0098 7,8305 3,07 0,003     8,4071    39,6125 
INF -4,5269 4,6639 -0,97 0,335 -13,8201   4,7661 
cons 2,1036 2,9832 0,71 0,483 -3,8406   8,0479 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
During the last 50 years, the single largest category of spending for many 
Western governments was the national defense. That allocation came about in the 
course of the Cold War, which rapid technical development and immediate 
preparedness were considered more important than economic efficiency. Redundant 
capabilities and inefficient practices were tolerated. The analysis of efficient defense 
production was not intensively pursued. 
In the very different circumstances that now prevail, the industrial 
infrastructure that currently builds the systems used by Western military 
establishments is in a transition period. The U.S. defense industry saw so many 
mergers and acquisitions during the 1990s. This consolidation process was actively 
encouraged by the U.S. Government with the aim of reducing procurement costs and 
sustaining a viable defense industrial base during a period of declining defense 
budgets. In response, companies either specialized in defense or exited the business 
altogether (James, 2000). The consolidation process has led to major changes in the 
structure of the U.S. defense industry and the industry structure that has emerged is 
characterized by considerable concentration. Thus, consolidation has seen the 
emergence of three giant defense companies—Lockheed-Martin, Boeing, and 
Raytheon—whose overall size and breadth of business activities dwarf their 
competitors in the United States and Europe (Table- 22). 
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Table-22: Top Defense Firms in 2000 by Defense Sales 
COMPANY DEFENSE SALES IN 2000 
($ Billion) 
Lockheed Martin (US) 18.00 
Boeing (US) 17.00 
Raytheon (US) 14.00 
BAE Systems (UK) 13.2 
 
General Dynamics (US) 6.5 
 
Northrop Grumman (US) 5.6 
 
(EADS) (France, Germany & Spain) 4.6 
THALES (FR) 4.3 
 
Source: Defense News (2001) 
 
The emergence of the U.S. industry giants has affected European defense 
firms to consolidate in an effort to create firms of a size thought necessary to 
compete in the new industry structure. The year 1999 saw consolidation in Europe 
leading to the emergence of two companies that will rival the leading U.S. companies 
in terms of defense sales. The creation of BAE Systems from the merger of British 
Aerospace and GEC Marconi Electronic Systems created a UK company with 
defense sales of more than $13 billion, making it the fourth largest defense contractor 
in the world after Raytheon. Equally, the planned merger of U.S.-German DASA 
with Aerospatiale-Matra of France and CASA of Spain to form European 
Aeronautics Defence and Space (EADS) will create a company with defense sales of 
almost $4,6 billion. These recent consolidation moves mean that three of the eight 
largest defense companies in the world are now European.  However, the U.S. 
defense industry is still the premier global producer of a variety of defense systems, 
the clear world leader in key systems integration skills and specialized technologies 
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(Flamm, 2000). It accounts for roughly half of world exports of military equipment. 
The United States’ weapons procurement budget exceeds the combined total of all its 
European NATO allies (Markusen, 2000). Despite large cutbacks in U.S. military 
spending, the U.S. defense industry dominates the global market. American 
industrial hegemony in armaments is easily visible in 2000 defense sales data 
compiled for the 100 largest defense suppliers worldwide, shown in Figure 1. U.S. 
suppliers accounted for almost 60 percent of $141 billion in global sales within this 
elite set of companies, compared to roughly one-third for European suppliers, 4.5 
percent for Japanese companies, 2.0 percent for Israeli firms, and about 0.2 percent 
for Russia. 
 
 
Figure 1: Share of Defense Sales by Top 100 Defense Firms Worldwide 
by National Origin of Company 
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Source: Defense Week (2001) 
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Today the Turkish defense industry, if allocated enough funds, is capable of 
meeting a significant part of the requirements of the Turkish Armed Forces. Both 
systems produced for the Turkish Armed Forces and the success of Turkish 
companies on the international market reveal that Turkish defense technology is 
advanced and can compete in the international markets. However, development of 
the Turkish defense industry has not reached to the desired level as of yet and has 
still crucial problems. 
The level of employment in the Turkish Defense Industry is not proportional 
with the size of the defense market. When the defense procurement levels are 
examined between 1997 and 2001, it is seen that it drops dramatically from $1,2 
billion to one third of it, $400 million. However, there is approximately no change in 
the employment level (Table-23). Although there is a huge decline in domestic 
procurement levels in the five-year period, that is similar to the decline in world 
defense market ten years ago, the employment level has a slight change of  + 4% and 
it is approximately stable with 25000 personnel in the five-year period. This 
unreactive behavior in the employment level of defense industry to the defense 
market shrinkage shows that while the national defense industry is trying to be 
protected, it becomes like a public sector with its high employment levels. 
When the employment groups are examined, the number of Engineers is only 
1/6 of total employment that is our defense industry does not give importance to the 
research and development activities, but it mainly focuses on production-oriented 
activities.  
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Table-23: Procurement and Employment Levels of Turkish Defense Sector 
 
Turkey 
Defense Sector Employment 
(Personnel Changes in The Last Three Years) 
 
Engineer : 4270 ±  85   (%2) 
 
Technician : 4400 ± 200  (%2) 
 
Management : 4250 ±   50  (%3) 
 
Worker :12000 ± 650 (%5) 
________________ 
TOTAL  24900 ± 985 (%4) 
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Thus, R&D budget of defense industry is only $40 million that is less than 
1/20 of western countries’ expenses. This indicates that R&D activities of Turkish 
defense products are mainly done abroad by the allied countries and as a result, the 
basic principle in our defense policies of meeting the defense requirements of Turkey 
with domestic equipment whenever possible is not succeeded. 
Another indication that can be made from Table-23 is, the number of 
management level personnel is approximately equal to the number of engineers. That 
reveals another serious question about the management systems efficiency of Turkish 
Defense Firms. 
When we look at the Table-24, we can see that the R&D budgets of world 
defense industries change in a range of ¼ and ¾ of their arms procurement budgets. 
 
 
Table-24: Arms Procurement and R&D Budgets of Western Countries 
                              Country          Arms             R&D         % 
                                                  Procurement (Billion $) 
 
 
US                  47                      35                74 
 
UK                 8.2                     3.9                48 
 
France           5.2                     3.1                60 
 
Germany       3.7                     1.2                32 
 
Italy              1.9                     0.5                 26 
 
Turkey         0.36                    0.012              3 
 
 Source: Defense News (2002) 
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This result also indicates that Turkey is protecting its production-based 
defense industry structure against the fluctuations on national and international 
demands but in fact, it should build, improve and protect R&D activities that are 
based on national science and technology. 
Consequently, national defense sector seems to be production based, 
dependent on western countries and inefficient as the public sector. However, it is 
possible to change this situation in a short period of time by improving R&D based 
activities insistently in a coordination of university-industry cooperation. Only in this 
way, the national defense sector can produce the technologies that our defense 
strategy needs. 
Having a strong defense industry is an important necessity of Turkey. 
Moreover, being a strong industry requires an adequate financial performance. 
Defense firms could be forced to have good  financial performance and this will 
develop the national defense industry. Therefore, this study analyzed the  financial 
performance of defense firms and identified the real and sustainable growth rate of 
defense firms by using Higgins’ model between the years 1997-2001. The study also 
examined how defense firms financed growth in sales and assets and how they 
should finance growth in accordance with the sustainable growth rate. The factors 
that affect the growth rate of the defense firms were also clarified. 
The financial performance of defense industry had a declining trend in the 
five-year period. While the net earnings after taxes was slightly declining by 10,39% 
between 1997-1999, it dramatically declined by 52,56% in 2000 and by 82,64% in 
2001. This is mainly because of the high interest expenses as a result of short-term 
debt financing strategy that defense firms had used heavily before the 1999 crisis. 
Although the earnings from operating activities increased in 2001, the net earnings 
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after taxes had declined to its minimum value because of high increases in the 
interest expenses. Defense industry has grown faster than its annual sustainable 
growth rate during the five-year period. Defense firms’ primary source of financing 
is debt, specifically short-term debt, to support the higher than sustainable growth 
rate. They reduced the level of equity financing and used a large dose of debt 
financing, compared to equity financing, to support the growth in sales and assets. 
The defense firms are facing serious financial distress today and will 
probably continue to face financial difficulties in the near future. As a result of this 
added debt load, some companies now face a declining interest expense coverage ratio. 
In order to sustain the business, the defense firms must slow their actual growth or 
increase their sustainable growth and should reduce the level of debt financing; 
especially short-term debt financing and should increase their equity financing. 
Although the real sustainable growth rate of defense industry without inflation effect 
is acceptable, the high inflation rate diminishes the real sustainable growth rate of 
defense industry to negative values and reduced the sustainable growth rate by 
29,6%. 
The operating income had a positive effect on defense firms’ growth that is 
statistically significant. The short-term debt to equity ratio had a negative effect on 
defense firms’ growth that is statistically significant (p=0,037). The defense firms 
relied on short-debt financing and reduced the level of equity financing; therefore 
they suffered from the high interest expenses that diminished the defense firms’ 
growth in the test period. Except the year 2000, other three years had negative effects 
on growth, however these effects are not statistically significant. GNP growth and 
inflation did not have significant effects on growth. Nevertheless, GNP growth had a 
positive effect on operating income of the defense firms that is statistically 
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significant in the test period. The inflation had a negative effect on operating income 
that is not statistically significant. Therefore, these facts are collectively a warning 
primarily for the industry but also for the Government. It is imperative that both 
industry and the Government customer work cooperatively to create a healthier 
environment and a more stable industrial base. It is essential for both economic and 
national security reasons. 
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APPENDIX 
 
(a) Ratios used in ROA Analysis: 
 
 
SalesNet
IncomeOperatingSalesOnturnOperating =Re  
 
 
SalesNet
AccrualsPayableAccountsAssetsTotalSalesNettoAssetsNet −−=  
 
 
AssetsNet
SalesNetRatioTurnoverAsset =  
 
 
RatioTurnoverAssetSalesOnturnOperatingTaxesBeforeAssetsOnturn *ReRe =
 
 
 
(b) Ratios Used in ROE Analysis 
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TC MERKEZ BANKASI ELEKTRONİK VERİ DAĞITIM SİSTEMİ 
 
Fiyat Endeksi(Toptan Eşya) (1994=100) (DİE) (Aylık) 
 
YILLIK,SABİT,Orijinal Gözlem 
 
 
 
      TP.FG.T01.TOP.1 
 
1994         100.2612 
1995         186.0358 
1996         327.2252 
1997         595.8134 
1998        1023.7080 
1999        1568.4452 
2000        2370.3869 
2001        3831.1092 
2002        5751.1280 
2003        6840.7000 
SEÇİLEN SERİLERİN AÇIKLAMALARI 
============================== 
TP.FG.T01.TOP.1: (Toplam)1.GENEL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMPANIES YEARS SALES GROWTH OPR. INCOME  NON-OPR.INCOME SH.T.DEBT/EQ.  LG.T. DEBT/EQ. T.ASSETGROWTH GNPGROWTH INFLATION 
ALCATEL  1997 0,083 1,313 0,412 0,743 0,078 0,069 0,083 0,821 
ALCATEL  1998 0,190 -0,466 -0,077 1,258 0,107 0,295 0,039 0,718 
ALCATEL  1999 -0,087 -2,568 0,914 2,046 0,297 0,164 -0,061 0,532 
ALCATEL  2000 0,006 -0,387 -0,499 2,530 0,480 -0,261 0,063 0,511 
ALCATEL  2001 0,244 -1,408 2,220 11,402 1,358 0,288 -0,094 0,616 
ASELSAN  1997 0,144 -0,472 4,582 1,537 0,402 0,086 0,083 0,821 
ASELSAN  1998 0,010 -0,152 0,003 1,211 0,721 0,044 0,039 0,718 
ASELSAN  1999 0,177 0,078 0,247 1,683 0,688 0,196 -0,061 0,532 
ASELSAN  2000 0,134 0,167 -1,362 2,436 0,503 0,131 0,063 0,511 
ASELSAN  2001 0,151 -1,661 -0,446 2,722 1,855 0,002 -0,094 0,616 
ASPİLSAN 1997 0,817 7,758 0,412 0,320 0,087 0,563 0,083 0,821 
ASPİLSAN 1998 -0,151 -1,749 0,520 0,357 0,126 -0,101 0,039 0,718 
ASPİLSAN 1999 -0,275 -0,080 0,096 0,222 0,141 -0,110 -0,061 0,532 
ASPİLSAN 2000 0,130 1,673 -0,692 0,176 0,211 -0,212 0,063 0,511 
ASPİLSAN 2001 -0,334 -2,478 0,515 0,185 0,296 -0,168 -0,094 0,616 
ÇANSAŞ  1997 -0,164 -1,065 1,337 1,709 0,448 -0,008 0,083 0,821 
ÇANSAŞ  1998 0,332 -0,383 3,433 4,064 1,740 0,136 0,039 0,718 
ÇANSAŞ  1999 0,471 0,535 0,639 2,278 0,382 -0,214 -0,061 0,532 
ÇANSAŞ  2000 -0,318 -0,451 -1,188 2,282 0,027 -0,100 0,063 0,511 
ÇANSAŞ  2001 -0,515 -0,058 -2,339 2,700 0,025 0,020 -0,094 0,616 
DITAS  1997 0,039 -3,888 0,840 0,509 0,000 0,775 0,083 0,821 
DITAS  1998 -0,083 2,634 -0,341 0,187 0,000 -0,293 0,039 0,718 
DITAS  1999 -0,194 -1,659 1,584 0,902 0,000 0,642 -0,061 0,532 
DITAS  2000 0,362 2,795 -0,924 0,564 0,000 -0,298 0,063 0,511 
DITAS  2001 0,170 2,318 -4,086 0,368 4,039 2,179 -0,094 0,616 
HAV.RAD. 1997 -0,403 0,543 -0,230 16,160 13,198 -0,178 0,083 0,821 
HAV.RAD. 1998 -0,311 -1,630 -6,597 2,013 15,196 0,600 0,039 0,718 
HAV.RAD. 1999 1,064 0,657 1,102 0,352 8,772 -0,146 -0,061 0,532 
HAV.RAD. 2000 -0,284 0,749 -0,388 0,076 0,190 -0,575 0,063 0,511 
HAV.RAD. 2001 0,484 1,944 0,695 0,100 0,197 0,186 -0,094 0,616 
HAV.TEK. 1997 -0,368 -0,307 0,358 20,847 10,376 -0,394 0,083 0,821 
HAV.TEK. 1998 0,888 -1,078 -0,016 5,787 3,329 -0,768 0,039 0,718 
HAV.TEK. 1999 -0,508 4,119 0,837 10,175 0,841 0,319 -0,061 0,532 
HAV.TEK. 2000 0,329 0,022 1,289 0,426 0,320 -0,540 0,063 0,511 
HAV.TEK. 2001 -0,273 -1,478 1,972 1,050 0,449 0,313 -0,094 0,616 
İŞBİR 1997 0,204 1,596 -0,300 2,933 0,126 0,794 0,083 0,821 
İŞBİR 1998 -0,074 -0,928 -0,422 2,844 0,142 -0,025 0,039 0,718 
İŞBİR 1999 0,239 13,812 4,130 2,766 0,092 0,748 -0,061 0,532 
İŞBİR 2000 0,160 -0,821 -0,369 4,795 0,153 0,229 0,063 0,511 
İŞBİR 2001 -0,386 -15,052 8,155 5,295 0,254 -0,414 -0,094 0,616 
 
3 
COMPANIES YEARS SALESGROWTH OPR. INCOME  NON-OPR.INCOME SH.T.DEBT/EQ LG.T.DEBT/EQ T.ASSETGROWTH GNPGROWTH INFLATION 
Mercedes-Benz 1997 0,215 -0,132 1,986 3,152 0,165 0,202 0,083 0,821 
Mercedes-Benz 1998 -0,216 -1,171 0,420 2,235 0,172 -0,132 0,039 0,718 
Mercedes-Benz 1999 -0,285 -9,996 -0,127 2,443 0,221 -0,044 -0,061 0,532 
Mercedes-Benz 2000 0,550 1,046 -0,092 1,556 0,212 -0,064 0,063 0,511 
Mercedes-Benz 2001 -0,355 -26,423 -0,523 2,302 0,280 -0,079 -0,094 0,616 
NETAŞ 1997 0,167 0,373 -0,876 0,611 0,119 -0,148 0,083 0,821 
NETAŞ 1998 -0,212 -0,582 -4,399 0,532 0,108 -0,145 0,039 0,718 
NETAŞ 1999 0,140 -0,749 3,146 1,197 0,162 0,316 -0,061 0,532 
NETAŞ 2000 0,032 2,787 -0,252 0,889 0,128 -0,151 0,063 0,511 
NETAŞ 2001 -0,340 -0,390 -0,689 1,101 0,093 -0,050 -0,094 0,616 
OTOKAR 1997 -0,289 -0,535 -0,611 1,411 0,676 -0,060 0,083 0,821 
OTOKAR 1998 0,417 4,862 -2,769 2,650 0,580 0,824 0,039 0,718 
OTOKAR 1999 0,179 -0,834 7,345 2,504 0,087 0,297 -0,061 0,532 
OTOKAR 2000 -0,005 0,537 0,167 1,547 0,093 -0,144 0,063 0,511 
OTOKAR 2001 -0,395 -15,728 2,512 2,201 0,105 0,155 -0,094 0,616 
PARSAN 1997 0,239 1,467 0,577 0,418 0,213 0,207 0,083 0,821 
PARSAN 1998 -0,139 -0,398 -0,087 0,641 0,215 0,268 0,039 0,718 
PARSAN 1999 -0,259 -2,053 1,625 0,597 0,120 -0,166 -0,061 0,532 
PARSAN 2000 0,313 1,366 -0,894 0,943 0,107 0,205 0,063 0,511 
PARSAN 2001 -0,362 -6,580 1,179 0,933 1,114 -0,182 -0,094 0,616 
PETLAS 1997 0,027 -0,527 0,208 0,121 0,000 -0,051 0,083 0,821 
PETLAS 1998 0,131 -0,260 0,388 0,049 0,000 0,004 0,039 0,718 
PETLAS 1999 0,067 0,806 -1,079 0,055 0,000 -0,070 -0,061 0,532 
PETLAS 2000 -0,150 -1,870 -0,099 0,067 0,000 -0,053 0,063 0,511 
PETLAS 2001 -0,244 0,285 0,031 0,058 0,000 -0,137 -0,094 0,616 
ROKETSAN 1997 0,088 0,881 -0,188 3,896 0,991 4,131 0,083 0,821 
ROKETSAN 1998 2,991 31,100 -1,472 1,327 1,646 -0,191 0,039 0,718 
ROKETSAN 1999 -0,438 -0,760 1,383 4,665 1,891 1,264 -0,061 0,532 
ROKETSAN 2000 0,634 1,028 -2,986 5,036 2,337 0,150 0,063 0,511 
ROKETSAN 2001 1,213 -2,230 3,569 3,529 2,982 0,193 -0,094 0,616 
TAİ 1997 0,580 3,583 -0,195 1,298 0,214 0,520 0,083 0,821 
TAİ 1998 -0,231 -2,765 3,711 0,622 0,448 0,126 0,039 0,718 
TAİ 1999 -0,067 -1,961 0,683 1,200 0,431 0,665 -0,061 0,532 
TAİ 2000 -0,374 0,271 -0,627 0,539 0,339 -0,402 0,063 0,511 
TAİ 2001 1,471 0,708 -0,232 1,082 0,304 0,168 -0,094 0,616 
TEİ 1997 0,117 0,709 -0,198 0,302 0,029 0,014 0,083 0,821 
TEİ 1998 0,070 -0,082 -0,155 0,247 0,064 0,026 0,039 0,718 
TEİ 1999 0,377 -0,177 0,427 0,296 0,042 0,079 -0,061 0,532 
TEİ 2000 0,420 1,890 -0,814 0,369 0,046 0,149 0,063 0,511 
TEİ 2001 0,479 0,798 2,301 0,283 0,054 0,155 -0,094 0,616 
 
4 
 
COMPANIES YEARS SALES GROWTH OPR. INCOME  NON-OPR.INCOME SH.T.DEBT/EQ.  LG.T. DEBT/EQ. T.ASSETGROWTH GNPGROWTH INFLATION 
TUSAŞ 1997 - 0,341 -0,301 0,024 0,021 0,029 0,083 0,821 
TUSAŞ 1998 - -0,462 1,966 0,026 0,008 2,034 0,039 0,718 
TUSAŞ 1999 0,708 -0,618 -0,224 0,050 0,013 -0,153 -0,061 0,532 
TUSAŞ 2000 0,150 0,406 -0,398 0,014 0,021 -0,265 0,063 0,511 
TUSAŞ 2001 0,276 -0,135 -0,217 0,036 0,033 -0,226 -0,094 0,616 
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